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1 Introduction  
People care about status, their relative position in society, because of the honour it carries and 
because it brings wealth and power. Vying for status and being jealous of each other, people 
enter social contests whose results establish the position of the elites in political and social 
hierarchies. It does not come as a surprise to read that notions of status, glory, honour and 
envy were fixtures of the values of the ancient Greek society, as the opening quote says. The 
present paper studies status seeking by integrating economic, political and social factors and 
shows how competition for individual status may improve social outcomes. Although the 
focus is ancient Greece the analysis of the paper is of broader interest as it studies important 
aspects of status seeking behaviour.   
According to the prominent ancient historian Moses Finley the ancient decision-maker 
strived to maximise status rather than income or profits. But Finley saw status as “an 
admirably vague word with considerable psychological element” (1979:51). He continued: “a 
model of economic choices … in antiquity would give considerable weight to this factor of 
status. I do not say it was the only factor that it weighed equally with all members of any 
order or status-group, nor do I know how to translate what I have said into a mathematical 
equation” (ibid:60). The present study takes up the latter challenge and studies formally status 
seeking in ancient Greece by employing the insights of modern economic literature to status.  
Finley’s so-called substantivist view that economic activities in antiquity were embedded in 
the political, social and religious spheres has been immensely influential in shaping the 
debate about the nature of the ancient economy. However, his emphasis on the significance of 
social values and his legacy of rejecting the applicability of profit maximisation to the ancient 
economy has led, perhaps inadvertently, to a more extreme rejection of the suitability of 
formal economic modelling to investigate the ancient economy. This is unfortunate because it 
has deprived the development of a complete understanding of several issues of interest which 
can be pursued more carefully by using a formal framework. The concern here is to trace 
carefully some aspects of status contests in ancient Greece, and especially Athens, by a 
suitable formal economic model which uses tools and insights of modern theory.  
The investigation considers individuals engaging in acts which elevate their social status 
among their peers by paying for liturgies (literally, works for the people), a specific 
institution by which rich individuals were obliged to privately finance the provision of public 
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goods and services including defence, and benefited payers and non-payers alike. The 
analysis explicitly recognises that (a) when status is desirable, individuals may increase their 
status by using up resources which can serve other objectives, (b) the status of an individual 
depends on the amount of resources spent to acquire status in comparison to what other 
individuals spend, and (c) the outcome of status contests by performing liturgies is 
comparable to a system of tax payment for public services. The analysis shows that although 
the quest for status was a negative externality for the contestants, it generated social benefits, 
because private spending for status was channelled to finance public provision.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews modern economics literature on status 
whose insights guide the present inquiry focusing on early economics contributions to status 
concerns, how contemporary research formalises status seeking, and the presumed effects of 
status seeking on income distribution. Section 3 introduces the basic elements of the debate 
between substantivism and formalism regarding the nature of the ancient Greek economy. 
Section 4 describes juridically defined status groups, that is, the tripartite distinction citizens-
metics-slaves, where different groups enjoy different formal legal rights, and group 
membership is formally and rigidly delineated; it then looks at factors whose presence 
conferred high social esteem to citizens and especially the ideal of land ownership. Section 5 
discusses liturgies which in the competitive society of ancient Greece featured prominently as 
a stage for the pursuit of status. Section 6 examines a formal choice model of the quest for 
status, where status is defined as the relative position of the individual on the social ladder, by 
paying for liturgies. It shows how paying for liturgies generated significant positive 
externalities to poorer individuals who benefited from the largess of the status seekers, a 
result of wider interest and importance. It then compares the size of public provision under 
liturgies to its analogue under income tax payments by the rich. Section 7 concludes. 
2 A selective review of the economics of status 
2.1 Precursors  
Throughout history people have desired status intrinsically, because they like it, and 
instrumentally, because it enables them to do things that they otherwise could not do (Frank 
and Heffetz 2011). Status considerations mean that the individual is concerned with his or her 
relative position on the social ladder. Weiss and Fershtman (1998 p.802) define social status 
as “a ranking of individuals (or groups of individuals) in a given society, based on their traits, 
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assets, and actions.” Status-seeking has a long pedigree in modern economic thought and has 
spawned a large and expanding theoretical and empirical literature. Veblen (1899) spoke of 
social recognition and prestige as the chief motives of human action. In what has become 
known as the relative income hypothesis of consumption, Duesenberry (1949) theorised that 
individual consumption is influenced by that of one’s neighbours. Hirsch (1976) saw the 
pursuit of social position as an important determinant of utility, while Pollak (1976) uncovers 
the properties of static and dynamic models of consumer preferences which depend on other 
people's past consumption.  
The so-called “Easterlin paradox” and the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) generated 
further impetus to research on status. Easterlin (1974) found that, contrary to the prediction of 
standard theory, despite substantial real income growth in Western countries reported 
happiness levels did not increase. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explained that decisions are 
affected by changes from a reference point rather than absolute states of wealth. In the 
context of status, the reference point is the average income or consumption of other 
individuals in a group used for comparisons (see Frey and Stutzer (2005), and Clark et al 
(2008) for wide ranging reviews of how relative income may affect individual happiness). 
Queries about the economic effects of status are part of the “happiness literature”, a research 
program closely related to behavioural economics. Behavioural economics incorporates 
insights from psychology into economic behaviour to investigate how individuals actually 
behave when they are characterised by bounded rationality and biased preferences, as 
opposed to how they would behave if they had perfect foresight. 
2.2 Status seeking and utility 
Concern with relative position introduces a negative externality into the standard utility 
maximisation framework. Formalization of status considerations by augmenting the utility 
function rests on the contention of behavioural economics that individual preferences are, to 
some degree at least, endogenous (or “internal”) to the particular institutional and social 
context where actions take place, and are shaped by ideologies including religion (see Bowles 
1998 and Hargreaves Heap 2013 for surveys of the theoretical literature and evidence from 
experiments). Individuals may be motivated by ethical considerations and possess social 
preferences such as altruism or envy, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold 
ethical norms. Thus, individual preferences are not confined to material self-interests only, as 
formation of preferences is part of the process of socialization (Postlewaite, 2011). 
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Frank and Heffetz (2011) reviewed the empirical work on the hypothesis that people care 
about their status in society. They concluded that there is plenty of evidence to support the 
hypothesis that preferences for status are an important determinant of economic outcomes. 
They point to three main features of social status which confer utility to the individual, 
positionality (or rank), desirability, and non-tradability. Since status is positional, it enters the 
utility function as a positional good, that is, as a good whose value depends on how it 
compares with the quantity of that good owned by others. Specifically, an agent’s utility 
depends negatively on what others have. As a result, competition for status leads individuals 
to spend on status-promoting activities but such expenses affect the distribution of status 
without creating social gains. Status-seekers will tend to overinvest in status-promoting 
activities creating deadweight losses for the society. Second, status is desirable, because it 
represents a means to acquire other resources (for example, a person of high status can access 
resources that are not available to those of lower status, may command authority and respect, 
etc). Third, status is non-tradable, in the sense that since it is the society which confers status, 
there is no explicit market where one can “buy” it.  
Like economic rents, the quest for status generates status-seeking activities. Frank (1985) 
shows that status seekers tend to overinvest in status seeking activities, which redistribute 
rather than create wealth. However, contrary to the negative externality effects of the status-
seeking game, Congleton (1989) observes that many contests for status generate benefits for 
individuals not participating in the contest, like higher consumption of entertainment, or 
technological externalities in the form of knowledge which reduces the cost of producing 
both status and non status goods. Further, he shows that “micro-status games”, that is, 
contests where the number of status-seekers is smaller than the population (like a footrace), 
which generate deadweight losses over time will tend to be replaced by games which 
generate positive externalities. However, no such clear-cut conclusion arises in the case of 
“macro-status games”, where all members of society gain or lose status from the activities 
involved. Since all members of the society participate in macro-status games, individual 
incentives to devise new, more efficient, status games diminish. For example, if status is 
determined by holdings of productive capital, and capital is accumulated through saving and 
entrepreneurship, the status game leads to higher production. But if status is determined by 
consumption, or abstinence from worldly activities, or emerging victorious from conflicts, 
welfare enhancing effects are absent. 
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2.3. Effects of status seeking on income distribution 
Turning to how status concerns may affect government policy, Pham (2005) examines the 
distribution of wealth and the formation of fiscal policy using a two-class inter-temporal 
growth model where individuals care about both consumption and social status, which is 
assumed to increase with individual wealth but decrease with average wealth. He finds that 
individuals with stronger status motive, rather than wealth endowment, end up holding a 
higher level of wealth. Moreover, if one class has a stronger incentive to accumulate wealth, 
higher wealth inequality is associated with higher growth, but a higher growth rate may 
reduce welfare of one class of agents and increase welfare of the other one. Finally, his model 
predicts that when the fiscal policy is endogenously determined through a voting mechanism, 
an increase in the strength of the status motive of the majority class may lead to a political-
equilibrium characterised by a lower growth rate.  
Charness et al (2013) used experiments to examine whether the quest for status leads to 
unethical activities such as sabotage or cheating to improve one’s ranking. They found that 
people care about their relative position, and that social comparisons even in the absence of 
monetary rewards increase motivation for work. However, they also report evidence that 
some individuals increase their rank by expending resources to sabotage other people’s work, 
to the detriment of group performance. Chaudry and Garner (2013) show that a greater 
degree of inside country income comparison leads to policies which limit the risk that the rich 
may become poor but this bias leads to lower growth. On the other hand, a greater degree of 
income comparison between the home country and foreign countries leads to greater growth.  
Gershman (2014) explores the combined effects of actual inequality, tolerance to inequality 
and opportunities for investment on growth. He investigates a two-stage dynamic envy game 
between two individuals. In the first stage each individual may choose to allocate part of his 
time to productive investment, which in combination with its endowment, raises his future 
productivity. In the second stage the individual divides his time between own production and 
the disruption of the other individual’s production process. If the initial inequality in the 
distribution of endowments is low, tolerance for inequality (which is determined by the level 
of protection of property rights) is high, and peaceful investment opportunities are abundant, 
then in equilibrium individuals compete peacefully for their status resulting in high effort and 
output, a so-called “keeping up with the Joneses” equilibrium. On the other hand, if initial 
inequality is high, tolerance for inequality is low, and investment opportunities are scarce, the 
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resulting “fear” equilibrium is one where the better endowed individual lowers effort to avoid 
destructive envy of the relatively poor. Finally, if inequality is high, tolerance for inequality 
is very low, and the productivity of investment is low, a “destructive” equilibrium arises, 
where there is actual conflict and time is used unproductively to destroy property.  
Jaikumar et al (2018) argue that conspicuous consumption might result in an improved sense 
of economic well-being, as it allows households to signal higher social status and their ability 
to ‘keep up with the Joneses’. They provide evidence that this is indeed the case and this 
effect is even more pronounced among households at the bottom of the income pyramid. 
3 The nature of the ancient Greek economy  
The nature of the ancient Greek economy has been the subject of a long scholarly debate 
between the primitivist-substantivist and the modernist-formalist schools of thought. Starting 
in 1893 with Karl Bücher, building on Max Weber’s analysis and culminating with the 
writings of Finley, the primitivist-substantivist view considered the economy as embedded in 
politics and religion, with actors lacking interests in profit maximization, enterprise and 
growth. Production remained small-scale focused on household activity in pursuit of self-
sufficiency at the household and city-state level, exchanges were based on reciprocity and 
redistribution via the state rather than the market, and individual choices were determined by 
social values (for extension and embellishments of this view, see Humphreys 1970, Austin 
and Vidal-Naquet 1977, Millet 1991, Sallares 1991, Engen 2010). On the other hand, the 
modernist-formalist view inspired by Eduard Meyer’s 1895 reply to Bücher argues that the 
ancient economy was market-based, populated by specialised production units, relied on inter-
connected markets independent of social relations, employed sophisticated contracts of 
exchange, and ran according to commercial principles (Burke 1992, Cohen 1992, Harris 2002, 
Amemiya 2007). 
Finley has been hugely influential in the study of the ancient Greek economy. His 
substantivist theory denies that the ancient economy existed as an area of activity 
independent of social relations, and rejects that standard economics has anything to 
contribute to the analysis of the ancient economy.1 In Finley's view, the value system of 
ancient Greece which emphasised the wellbeing of the community over that of the individual 
                                                             
1 “The ancients ... lacked the concept of an ‘economy’, and a fortiori, they lacked the 
conceptual elements which together constitute what we call the ‘economy’ ” (Finley 1979:21).  
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dominated individual actions and as a result economic activities were subordinate to social 
and political pursuits. We may breakdown Finley’s view into two essential elements, a 
theoretical and an empirical. The theoretical is that the economy was embedded in religion and 
politics; the empirical was that the economy did not grow. By now a large body of historical 
evidence has revealed that the latter assertion does not stand up to scrutiny: During the period 
800-300 BCE, ancient Greece experienced an unprecedented efflorescence characterised by 
significant population growth, rise in the standard of living, urbanisation and cultural 
achievements (see Morris 2004, Scheidel 2010, Harris & Lewis 2015, Ober 2015, Bresson 
2016). However, there is value in the theoretical argument that the economy was embedded, 
since all economies are conditioned on their socio-cultural and institutional environments. 
Whether economic activity may or may not be dominated by politics is taken up by North et 
al (2009). They consider the link between economics and politics as a fundamental part of the 
long-run development process (although they left the nature of the ancient economy out of 
their book). They draw a distinction between natural or limited access and open access order 
states. Natural, states are those where “personal relationships, who one is and who one 
knows, form the basis of social organization and constitute the arena for individual 
interaction” (p.13) and entail economies embedded in social relationships. They consider all 
states as natural states up to the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries (p.164). On the contrary, in an 
open access order, “impersonal categories of individuals interact over a wide area of social 
behaviour with no need to be cognizant of the individual identity of their partners” (ibid: 2); 
an open access order implies a market or disembedded economy. Centralised Sparta and 
Macedon were probably typical natural states; however, during the fifth and fourth centuries, 
democratic and economically successful Athens, where free and politically equal (male only) 
citizens collectively governed the polis, was not a natural state but had transformed to an open 
access state (Ober 2015, Carugati et al 2019). This embedded v disembedded part of the 
debate still animates research in the ancient Greek economy.2  
                                                             
2 For example, Christesen (2003) discusses the suitability of the concepts of instrumental, 
procedural and expressive rationality to ancient Greece; he argues that expressive rationality, 
according to which individuals strive to maximize profits and espouse social norms, is a better 
descriptor of economic decision-making in Classical Athens. Foxhall (2007) argues that wealthy 
households sought opportunities to maximize domestic production while poor households were more 
like subsistence farmers. Schefold (2011) maintains that the Athenian economy was neither capitalist 
nor devoid of capitalistic elements and contends that the modern neoclassical economic theory is at 
best of limited applicability to ancient Greece. Lewis (2018), without fully abandoning Finley’s 
approach, supports the application of the methodology of New Institutional Economics (NIE) and its 
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4 Status in Ancient Greece 
4.1 Juridical status 
In Finley’s view of the ancient society “invariably what are conventionally called ‘class 
struggles’ in antiquity prove to be conflicts between groups at different points in the spectrum 
disputing the distribution of specific rights and privileges” (1979:68). Specifically, drawing 
on Max Weber, Finley rejected the term “class” in its Marxist sense of “class struggle” and 
“class exploitation” as an explanation of ancient social and economic relations, and 
emphasises the presence of “orders”. Order is “a  juridically defined group within a 
population, possessing formalized privileges and  disabilities in one or more fields of activity, 
governmental, military, legal, economic, religious, marital, and standing in a hierarchical 
relation to other orders” (Finley 1979:45, emphasis in the original).3  
In ancient Athens, the richest and best documented ancient Greek polis, juridical status 
described the distinction between the free citizens enjoying full political and civic rights and 
two groups lacking such rights, foreign-born residents called “metics”, and slaves. Hansen 
(1999:86) writes “The division shows that Athens was a society based on ‘orders’ rather than 
‘classes’, for the tripartition was by legal status, i.e. it was based on privileges, or otherwise, 
protected by law. Membership of a group was typically inherited.” 4 Stylistically, land-
owning citizens were farmers. The landless poor found employment in the navy and the 
crafts, and drew payments from the state when serving in public posts. Slaves were the 
property of their masters; however, they could not be killed by their masters and could seek 
asylum in designated shrines and then ask to be sold to other masters. Slaves were used in 
domestic services and as skilled and unskilled labour in the farms, workshops and mines, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
emphasis on Transaction Costs and bounded rationality to study the workings of the ancient Greek 
economy. Stanley (2019) reviews the applicability of the polar distinction between embedded and 
disembedded to the Athenian economy, and concludes that from the sixth century onwards the 
Athenian economy most likely combined elements of both. 
3 Contrary to Finlay, de Ste. Croix held that Marxist concepts best represent social differences 
in ancient Greece. For critical discussions of the debate between Finley and de Ste. Croix and 
refinement by later authors see Nafissi (2004) and Kamen (2013). This debate regarding class conflict 
in ancient Greece is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. 
4 Kamen (2013) argues that the boundaries between these groups were less fixed and more 
permeable than the Athenians themselves acknowledged, and that a fruitful approach is one which 
recognises a spectrum of statuses in classical Athens; namely, chattel slaves, privileged chattel slaves, 
conditionally freed slaves, metics, privileged metics, bastards, disenfranchised citizens, naturalized 
citizens, female citizens, and male citizens. For a recent discussion of the Athenian social structure 
see also Pritchard (2020). 
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after paying their masters they could work on their own account in the crafts and the services 
including banking. However, they were not protected by the courts; their testimonies were 
accepted only if extracted by torture, and were given physical punishments which were 
forbidden for free citizens. Metics were artisans and traders, but could also work as farm 
tenants; they had to choose an Athenian citizen as a sponsor, paid special poll taxes, were 
required to serve in the army and were not allowed to own land or houses.  
Yet another legal distinction within the free citizen body was that between male and female. 
Women had no political rights, neither did they participate in the assemblies of the demos, 
nor did they occupy political office. In legal matters they were represented by a male 
guardian, father, husband, or relative. The decision to marry was taken by their fathers. The 
legislation regarding dowries of divorced women, or married women if died childless, and 
properties of heiresses without brothers aimed to ensure that property would remain within 
the family rather than going to outsiders. Nor could women run commercial enterprises, 
although Spartan women enjoyed more freedom in managing estates, as Spartan men were 
preoccupied with military interests. 
4.3 Economic pursuits and relative social status 
The focus of this study is the actions which individuals may take to gain social status, in the 
sense of achieving higher relative position and commanding respect. We therefore leave aside 
juridical status which was rigid allowing little, if any, room for individual choice 5 and turn to 
status as relative social standing among free citizens, which in the context of ancient Greece 
connoted honour (timê). We focus on the factors which chosen by the individual could bring 
high social status. 
Millet (2000) argues that around the Aegean Sea about half the total population earned its 
living from farming. In ancient Greece the basic unit of economic and social organization 
was the household (oikos) comprising, the house as a building, its land and equipment, the 
persons living in the house and their belongings. The land-owning elite viewed wealth from 
commercial and industrial activities with contempt, and disdained dependent work as 
                                                             
5 One could neither choose the gender at birth nor the group of birth (citizen, metic or slave). 
Several individuals must have deliberately decided to emigrate from their birthplaces to Athens and 
become metics for economic reasons, but they knew that they would have fewer rights than citizens. It 
was also possible for slaves to be manumitted elevating to metic status and for metics (including ex-
slaves) to be granted full citizenship. 
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unbecoming for a free man. Possession of large tracts of land was the most important 
determinant of status. Self-employed free artisans and traders offered their services as 
independent operators rather than employees for limited tasks and times, and for different 
clients. Further, craftsmen who earned their living from manual labour were held in low social 
esteem, because they performed vulgar or brutal (“banausic”) work. Finley argued that the 
traditional values of the elite in favour of possession of agricultural land and participation 
into political activity are found in the literary evidence, and prevailed from the time of 
Homer, 9th century BCE, to the end of the Roman Empire, 3rd century CE. However, not 
only would one expect attitudes to vary through that very long period (so that there may not 
be a single ideal to characterize “the Greek society” over such a long period), but, as the 
authors of the surviving texts were members of the elite, the ideal of landed wealth was not 
necessarily shared by the entire population.  
During the Archaic period 800-500 BC, social status among free male citizens was related to 
birth within the land-owning aristocracy. Politics was their principal pursuit; participation in 
political activity conferred a higher status than economic-commercial pursuits. The land-
owning aristocrats were the ruling class holding the offices of state. The stage changed in the 
5th and 4th centuries with the gradual establishment and deepening of democracy, the 
enfranchisement of the middle and poorer classes and full access to public office. In Athens, 
the sons of aristocratic families with political ambitions had to compete for influence in the 
Assembly of the Demos, where power of argument and rhetorical ability carried the day (see 
Tridimas 2019 and the literature cited therein). Nevertheless, members of the elite with 
oligarchic tendencies resisted democracy not only because of the financial burdens it levied 
on them, but also because democratic decision making by the poor majority denied their 
superior social status the freedom to conduct policy. During that period individuals of lower 
birth could also acquire social status by their achievements in the battlefield. Displaying 
andreia (translated as masculinity), bravery and courage when fighting for the city-state as a 
hoplite or as a sailor, brought high social esteem. Financial contributions to the polis by rich 
landowners or successful business people could also bring social status.  
5 Performing liturgies and the pursuit of status 
Social status and glory are attributes conferred by the society; there are no open markets 
where status can be directly bought or sold. On the other hand, as already said, there are 
actions which can be easily observed by the society and when performed confer status. 
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Socrates tells Aristippus: “what about those who labour so that they ... do good deeds for 
their fatherland? Surely one should know that these both labour for such things with pleasure 
and take delight in living, since they admire themselves and are praised and emulated by 
others” (Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.1.19) ... “if you desire to be honoured by some city, you 
must benefit the city” (ibid 2.1.28) – emphasis added. Rahe (1984:286) commented: “The 
polis ... provided the citizen with the hope of achieving through his contributions to its 
welfare at least a shadow of the eternal fame”. Contributions to the welfare of the polis took 
the form of payment for liturgies, the compulsory private financing of public expenditure, and 
opened the opportunity for contest for status. 
 Liturgies were an integral and distinct component of Athenian public finances, where the richest 
Athenians, about twelve hundreds of them, covered the cost of a number of public services. 
Each year the appropriate magistrates announced the liturgies to be performed and called for 
volunteers. If fewer volunteers than the number of liturgies came forward, the magistrates 
called upon wealthy citizens who had not volunteered. There were about one hundred annual 
liturgies falling into three broad categories, public festivals, pre-payment of the property tax 
levied on the rich, and defence. Liturgies for festivals related to payments for public banquets 
(“hestiasis”) which were the main occasions for consuming meat, torch-race 
(“gymnasiarchy”), maintaining an embassy to Panhellenic games and festivals 
(“architheoria”), organising processions carrying the veil of the goddess Athena 
(“arrephoria”), and training and equipping choirs performing at festivals and theatre plays 
(“choregia”).6 The vast majority of Athenians did not pay direct income or wealth taxes as 
personal taxation was a sign of servitude.7 A property tax was levied only to the richest 
Athenians. Another liturgy, the ‘proeisphora’, formalised in 378 worked as follows. Those 
liable to pay the property tax were divided into one hundred groups and the top three or so 
richest individuals of each group performed the liturgy of paying the tax for the entire group. 
They would then recover the taxes due from the rest of the members of the group.  
The most expensive liturgy was the “trierarchy” (established ca 480) consisting of the 
command, outfitting, and maintenance of a trireme ship for one year at a cost of one talent 
                                                             
6 See Davies (1967) for a detailed description of civilian liturgies which were parts of festival 
celebrations in Athens and outside Athens. Such festivals could cost between 300 to 3,000 drachmas. 
Contrary to the other liturgies, festival liturgies could also be levied on metics. 
7 A 5% tax on produce was levied during the tyranny of Peisistratus and his heirs, 546-510, 
but it was abolished after the foundation of democracy. 
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(6,000 drachmas).8  The “trierarch” (person responsible) was chosen between the 300-1200 
richest citizens. “To be one of the rich citizens who performed liturgies a man would have to 
have a property of at least 3 or 4 talents. 1 talent equals what an ordinary Athenian could earn 
in the course of more than ten years, so that the property of any one of the roughly 1200 
liturgists would represent a lifetime’s ordinary earnings” (Hansen, 1999:115). Individuals 
performing liturgies in one year were exempt from the obligation of another liturgy in the 
following year; trierarchs were normally exempt from other liturgies. Upon successful 
completion liturgists were awarded golden crowns, while in the case of successful raids the 
trierachy yielded war booty too. 
Liturgists could pay as much as they chose for the liturgy assigned. Those refusing to 
undertake liturgies faced penalties including fines, loss of property and even loss of 
citizenship. Since there was no bureaucracy to assess the wealth of citizens, the Athenians 
operated a system partly based on self-assessment and partly on assessment by others with 
disputes resolved by the courts. A system of so-called property exchange (“antidosis”) 
purported to find out whether rich individuals concealed their wealth to avoid liturgies: The 
nominee for a liturgy could challenge another person, who in his view ought to perform the 
liturgy, either to pay for the liturgy or to exchange his property with that of the nominee and 
then the nominee would perform the liturgy. The challenged citizen could then either accept 
the liturgy or exchange property with the nominee, or demand that the matter would be 
resolved by a court.9 Out of the surviving records for 492 trierarchs, 110 are known to have 
gone to court. Hansen reports that there is “not a single example of an exchange of property 
actually taking place” (1999, p.112).  
During the period of democracy, performing a liturgy was considered a duty and an honour 
for a rich Athenian (Lyttkens, 2013). Citizens competing for social recognition demonstrated 
                                                             
8 Gabrielsen (1994) offers a detailed analysis of the finances of the Athenian navy.  
9 The antidosis procedure bears a certain similarity to the “Harberger tax” proposed by Posner 
and Weyl (2017) in response to the following private ownership dilemma. Private ownership of 
resources gives the owner monopoly power over an asset, but as is well known, monopoly reduces 
allocative efficiency; on the other hand, private ownership generates superior incentives for 
investment and therefore increases efficiency. Posner and Weyl claim that a mixed version of private 
and common ownership, which they call “partial common ownership”, optimizes across allocative 
and investment efficiency and argue for a self-assessed property taxation, or “Harberger tax” which 
would fulfill this function. Under the Harberger tax, “people periodically report valuations of their 
property to a government registry; pay property taxes based on these valuations; and are required to 
sell their property at these valuations to any buyer” (2017:54). We leave the implications of the 
antidosis system for the definition and protection of private property rights in ancient Greece for 
future research.  
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their higher social status and wealth by performing liturgies. “Gift-giving [to the polis] ... was 
a major social area in which members of the elite could challenge one another” (Gygax, 
2016:15). For those harbouring political ambitions, paying for a liturgy simultaneously 
offered the opportunity to promote their chances for election to public office. Lyttkens 
(2013:80) brings attention to the signalling role of liturgies, “the most effective way of 
signalling great wealth was to give things away for free”. Harding (2015:89) calls liturgies “a 
canny exploitation of the ambition for distinction [philotimia – pride] of the elite members of 
the society”. Paying for liturgies aligned private incentives for status seeking with the public 
interest in providing public goods like warships, other services deemed socially desirable like 
festivals characterised by non-rivalry (up to capacity constraint), and plain private goods like 
banquets. The expectation of the liturgist to receive honours and social recognition implies a 
certain element of reciprocity between the liturgist and the citizenry, not unlike the concepts 
emphasised by the substantivist view of the economy. Gygax (2016) dwells on two aspects of 
these reciprocal relationships. First, it was not straightforward to calculate the monetary 
equivalent of a liturgy to what the liturgist received in return. Second, for the liturgist the gift 
was deferred, since he received the honours at a later, uncertain, time.  
However, in so far as those liable to perform liturgies disbursed similar sums but had unequal 
assets, liturgies were regressive. Given that the cost of liturgies, and especially trierarchies, 
was substantial, the literary sources indicate that from the end of the fifth century and during 
the fourth century, wealthy individuals were accused of trying to avoid them by hiding their 
wealth. After the demise of democracy in 322, the trierarchy was abolished. Remaining 
festivals were financed through “benefactions”, payments by a single individual who was 
obliged to make the payment only once in his lifetime and whose contribution was matched 
by public funds (see Davies 2008, Harding 2015, and Gygax 2016, for details). 10 
6 A formal model of liturgy spending for status seeking  
                                                             
10 In addition to liturgies, a number of scholars saw trials in Athens as contests for status 
(Ober 1989, Cohen 1995, Lanni 2009, Lyttkens 2013). In addressing the courts, litigants spent 
considerable time highlighting their characters, public reputations and contributions to public service 
while simultaneously accusing their opponents of lack of such attributes and donations. Such 
arguments were offered because they must have appealed to the mass of jurors, who shared the same 
values regarding envy, honour and hybris. Cohen (op.cit) contends that in this light Athenian litigation 
is best understood as feud and the process of judicial judgment as operating within an agonistic social 
field; Herman (2006) however, challenges this view. We leave the examination of court trials as status 
contests for future research. 
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6.1 Taxes, public goods and liturgies  
There is a dearth of economic analysis of liturgies. Carmichael (1997) considers a model 
where rich citizens may engage in costly concealment of their wealth to avoid paying for a 
liturgy. His simulation results show that when liturgists receive private benefits, like the 
goodwill of the demos, which compensate them for their expenses, liturgies are an efficient 
form of paying for public services. Kaiser (2007) offers a game theoretic analysis of liturgies 
as a mechanism to achieve simultaneously efficient provision of public goods and their 
voluntary private funding (voluntary in the sense of choosing how much to spend). Her 
empirical results show that trierarchs paid for the liturgy not only for prestige and power but 
also because by complying with the regulation they protected their assets and long-run 
financial interests. The present study adds to this meagre stock by investigating payment for 
liturgies as a status seeking expense. 
The obligation of the rich to perform liturgies was effectively a system of a progressive tax 
combined with hypothecation of the tax revenue to specific uses with two important 
characteristics. First, the tax basis was the number of rich individuals rather than the size of 
their incomes. Redistribution was achieved by obliging only the rich to pay for public 
services which were then consumed by the poor and rich alike. Second, those liable to tax did 
not transfer any money to the treasury but financed the assigned public service directly. Not 
only did they seek the suppliers and organise provision, but they also chose how much to 
spend, in the quest to win the gratitude of the demos. On the one hand, this mode of provision 
minimised the transaction costs of the public service as it bypassed both tax collection and 
public provision by a state agent. The ancient Greeks did not collect statistical information 
regarding the size of income activity; the cost of calculating the latter in a decentralised 
economy of agricultural and handicraft production was formidable. Moreover, the intellectual 
environment of free citizens was most likely hostile to a centralized bureaucracy; even the 
army was in truth a militia of free citizens. On the other hand, with the system of liturgies 
rich citizens retained considerable influence over public finances and ultimately power. This 
made the system a lot more palatable to the rich reducing social tensions, while it also put in 
public use the competitive instincts of the elite. Liturgies were therefore in line with the 
tenets of the New Institutional Economics. That is, in response to ubiquitous uncertainty, actors 
set up formal and informal institutions to decrease the cost of uncertainty by regulating conflict 
and governing exchanges. Lyttkens (2103:110) sees “the formalisation of the liturgical 
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system ... as the creation of a market for honour, with the government selling positions of 
honour to increase revenue”. Further, “there was clearly an honorific element involved: 
people sometimes paid out more than they had on their liturgies, as lavish spending could be 
useful both politically and in front of the popular courts” (ibid: 111).  
6.2 Individual and collective liturgy payments  
Formally, we assume a society with two classes of citizens, the poor majority, indexed 
by 𝑝 and the rich elite further divided into two players 1 and 2 who are liable to pay for 
liturgies. The model takes the number of rich taxpayers as decided in a previous stage and 
therefore exogenous; we leave the question of how the number of taxpayers liable was chosen 
for future research. Let 𝐶ℎ, 𝐿ℎ  and 𝐺 denote respectively private consumption, leisure, and a 
public good collectively consumed by the society, and let 𝑊ℎ  denote the labour productivity 
of ℎ = 𝑝, 1,2, where 𝑊1 > 𝑊𝑝  and 𝑊2 > 𝑊𝑝 . We approximate the system of private finance 
of the public goods by liturgies as follows.11 There are no income taxes in the economy, but 
the poor force the two rich individuals to pay for the public good 𝐺. The two rich individuals 
then chose to provide the quantities 𝐺1 and 𝐺2, so that the poor consume a total quantity of 
the public good  𝐺𝑆 =  𝐺1 +  𝐺2. It is assumed that each rich individual fully accepts the 
obligation to pay for the liturgy, so questions of free riding and incentive compatibility do not 
arise. We further assume that each liturgist provides the same quality of the public good and 
pays the same price – unit cost for the quantity of the public goods provided, but is free to 
choose different quantities.  
As per standard treatment it is posited that individuals have identical utility functions. 
Assuming Cobb-Douglas utility function12, the representative poor chooses  𝐶𝑝 and 𝐿𝑝 to 
maximise 
  𝑈𝑝 = 𝑎𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑝 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑆 + (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑃      (1) 
The latter is subject to the budget constraint, where 𝑌 denotes income 
                                                             
11 What follows is a highly simplified fiscal system. The Athenians operated a complex 
system of public finances, where in addition to property taxes levied on wealthy individuals and 
lump-sum taxes on non-Athenians, revenue was raised from the royalties from the silver mines and 
trade taxes. See Kyriazis (2009) for a detailed account of Athenian public finances in the 4th century. 
12 The Cobb-Douglas specification implies that the sizes of leisure and consumption of the 
poor are independent of the fiscal variables; the latter affect only the size of public provision. 
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   𝑌𝑝 = 𝑊𝑝(1 − 𝐿𝑝) =   𝐶𝑝       (2)  
That is, income is spent entirely on consumption. Solving the above, we obtain the 
equilibrium expressions 
 𝐿𝑃 =
1−𝛼−𝛽
1−𝛽
         (3.1) 
 𝑌𝑃 =  𝐶𝑃 =
𝛼
1−𝛽
𝑊𝑃        (3.2) 
The utility of each rich person is assumed to depend positively on the total size of the public 
good, but vying for social status the marginal utility from own provision exceeds that of the 
provision by the other person. That is, 𝐺2 confers to individual 1 less utility than 𝐺1 , and vice 
versa, by a proportion 𝛾 with 0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1 . 13  This modelling of status follows the formulation 
of envy or rivalry used in the literature where the individual compares his spending to the rest 
of the society (see Frank 1985; Solnick and Hemenway 1998; Layard 2005).  
The utility of 𝑖 = 1,2;  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 is then written as 
 𝑈𝑖 =  𝑎𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖  + 𝛽𝑙𝑛( 𝐺𝑖 + (1 − 𝛾) 𝐺𝑗) + (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖     (1.A) 
In the above expression the 𝛾 parameter shows how much individual 𝑖 cares for his relative 
status; a larger 𝛾 indicates that 𝑖 is more concerned with his status and derives less utility 
from the contribution of 𝑗 to the public good. The externality is absent in the extreme case 
of 𝛾 = 0 . In the opposite extreme of 𝛾 = 1 envy is at its highest so that the provision by 
individual 2 does not confer utility to 1 and vice versa. With 𝑃 denoting the relative unit price 
of the public good relative to the private consumption, the budget constraint of 𝑖 = 1,2 is 
  𝑌𝑖  = 𝑊𝑖(1 − 𝐿𝑖)  =  𝐶𝑖 +  𝑃𝐺𝑖      (4) 
Substituting into (4) into (1.A) and maximising with respect to 𝐿𝑖 and  𝐺𝑖 yields the reaction 
functions of 1 and 2 (not shown). Upon solving the latter we obtain the Nash equilibrium 
solutions for leisure, private consumption, income, and liturgy provision of each 𝑖 = 1,2; 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
                                                             
13 Were the poor to also pay for the public service, again the status seeking rich would have 
valued their contributions at 1 − 𝛾. 
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 𝐿𝑖𝑆 =
1−𝛼−𝛽
1−(1−𝛽)2(1−𝛾)2
(1 − (1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)2 + 𝛽(1 − 𝛾)
𝑊𝑗
𝑊𝑖
)  (5.1) 
 𝑌𝑖𝑆 =
𝛼+𝛽−𝛼(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)2
1−(1−𝛽)2(1−𝛾)2
𝑊𝑖 −
𝛽(1−𝛼−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
1−(1−𝛽)2(1−𝛾)2
𝑊𝑗     (5.2) 
 𝐶𝑖𝑆 =
𝛼
1−(1−𝛽)2(1−𝛾)2
((1 − (1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)2)𝑊𝑖 + 𝛽(1 − 𝛾)𝑊𝑗)  (5.3) 
 𝐺𝑖𝑆 =
𝛽
1−(1−𝛽)2(1−𝛾)2
1
𝑃
(𝑊𝑖 − (1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)𝑊𝑗)    (5.4) 
For an interior solution of (5.1) it must be 0 < 𝐿𝑖𝑆,  𝐿𝑗𝑆 < 1. With 1 − (1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)
2 >
0 we are guaranteed that 𝐿𝑖𝑆 > 0  and 𝐿𝑗𝑆 > 0. For  𝐿𝑖𝑆 < 1 and 𝐿𝑗𝑆 < 1 the 
conditions 
𝛽(1−𝛼−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
𝛼(1−(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)2)+𝛽
<
𝑊𝑗
𝑊𝑖
  and 
𝛽(1−𝛼−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
𝛼(1−(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)2)+𝛽
<
𝑊𝑗
𝑊𝑖
  must hold simultaneously. 
Since 
𝛽(1−𝛼−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
𝛼(1−(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)2)+𝛽
< 1 the two inequalities are consistent with each other for a large 
range of parameter values; we assume that the parameters are such that the conditions hold. 
With  0 < 𝐿𝑖𝑆 ,  𝐿𝑗𝑆 < 1 we are also guaranteed that 𝑌𝑖𝑆 > 0 and 𝑌𝑗𝑆 > 0. Next, for 𝑌𝑖𝑆 > 𝑌𝑃  ,
𝑖 = 1, 2,  that is, the income of each one of the highly productive individuals exceeds the 
income of the poor individual, it must be 
(𝛼+𝛽−𝛼(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)2)𝑊𝑖−𝛽(1−𝛼−𝛽)(1−𝛾)𝑊𝑗
1−(1−𝛽)2(1−𝛾)2
1−𝛽
𝛼
>
𝑊𝑃 ;  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 for 𝑖 = 1, 2 . Again, we assume that the parameters are such that the inequalities 
hold. Further, regarding the incomes of the two most productive individuals using (5.2) and 
manipulating we obtain that 𝑌𝑖𝑆 − 𝑌𝑗𝑆 =
−𝛼(1−𝛽)
1−(1−𝛽)2(1−𝛾)2
(1 − 𝛾 +
1
1−𝛽
) (1 − 𝛾 −
𝛼+𝛽
𝛼
) (𝑊𝑖 − 𝑊𝑗) > 0 (since 0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1), which yields 𝑌𝑖𝑆 > 𝑌𝑗𝑆   for 𝑊𝑖 > 𝑊𝑗 . That is, the 
highest productivity individual is also the individual with the highest income.  
Turning to the sizes of the liturgies, from (5.4) we have that for both 𝐺𝑖𝑆 and 𝐺𝑗𝑆 to be 
positive it must be simultaneously 
 
𝑊𝑖
𝑊𝑗
>  (1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾) and   
𝑊𝑗
𝑊𝑖
>  (1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)  (5.5) 
Since 1 > (1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾) the two inequalities are consistent with each other for a large 
range of parameter values; we assume that the parameters are such that the conditions in (5.5) 
hold, so that 𝐺𝑖𝑆 > 0 and  𝐺𝑗𝑆 > 0 . 
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Next, taking the difference between 𝐺1𝑆 and  𝐺2𝑆 , we have 
 𝐺𝑖𝑆 − 𝐺𝑗𝑆 =  
𝛽(𝑊𝑖−𝑊𝑗)
(1−(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾))𝑃
 > (<) 0   as  𝑊𝑖 > (<) 𝑊𝑗   (5.6) 
That is, among the rich, the most productive individual makes a larger contribution to public 
provision than the less productive individual. Regarding the effect of status seeking on 
individual provision upon differentiating (5.4) we derive 
𝑑𝐺𝑖𝑆
𝑑𝛾
=
𝛽(1−𝛽)
(1−(1−𝛽)2(1−𝛾)2)2𝑃
[(1 +
(1 − 𝛽)2(1 − 𝛾)2)𝑊𝑗 − 2(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)𝑊𝑖 ] which yields 
  
𝑑𝐺𝑖𝑆
𝑑𝛾
> (<) 0   as  
1+(1−𝛽)2(1−𝛾)2
2(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
𝑊𝑗 > (<) 𝑊𝑖     (5.7) 
If 𝑊𝑗 >  𝑊𝑖  and noting that 
1+(1−𝛽)2(1−𝛾)2
2(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
> 1 , the liturgy payment of the less wealthy 
individual 𝑖 increases with the size of the status parameter 𝛾. However, the response of the 
more productive individual to a change in 𝛾 is ambiguous. 
Further, upon dividing (5.4) by (5.2), we identify the ratio of liturgy payment to income, that 
is, the implicit personal tax rate levied on 𝑖 by the obligation to provide a liturgy. 
 𝑡𝑖𝑆 =
𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑆
𝑌𝑖
=
𝛽(𝑊𝑖−(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)𝑊𝑗)
(𝛼+𝛽(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)2)𝑊𝑖−𝛽(1−𝛼−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
    (5.8) 
The latter shows that the implicit tax rate depends on the difference of the earning abilities of 
the taxpayers. With 𝑌𝑖𝑆 > and 𝐺𝑖𝑆 > 0  we are assured that 𝑡𝑖𝑆 > 0 for 𝑖 = 1,2.  
Turning to the aggregate performance of the economy, we obtain that the sums of 
consumption and income of the rich and total size of the public good provided to the poor are 
respectively 
   𝑌𝑆 =  𝑌1𝑆 +  𝑌2𝑆 =
𝛼(1+(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾))+𝛽(1−𝛼−𝛽)
(1−𝛽)(1+(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾))
(𝑊1 + 𝑊2)    (6.1) 
   𝐶𝑆 =  𝐶1𝑆 + 𝐶2𝑆 =
𝛼(1−(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)2+𝛽(1−𝛾))
1−(1−𝛽)2(1−𝛾)2
(𝑊1 + 𝑊2)    (6.2) 
   𝐺𝑆 =  𝐺1𝑆 +  𝐺2𝑆 =
𝛽
(1+(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾))
(
𝑊1+𝑊2
𝑃
)     (6.3) 
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Examining the responses of  𝑌𝑆 , 𝐶𝑆 and 𝐺𝑆 to the status parameter 𝛾 we have  
 
𝑑𝑌𝑆
𝑑𝛾
=
𝛽(1−𝛼−𝛽)
(1+(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾))
2 (𝑊1 + 𝑊2) > 0     (7.1) 
 
𝑑𝐶𝑆
𝑑𝛾
=
−𝛽(1−(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾))
2
(1−(1−𝛽)2(1−𝛾)2)2
(𝑊1 + 𝑊2) < 0     (7.2) 
 
𝑑𝐺𝑆
𝑑𝛾
=
𝛽(1−𝛽)
(1+(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾))
2 (
𝑊1+𝑊2
𝑃
) > 0       (7.3) 
The above establish unequivocally that as a result of status seeking the rich collectively 
generate a higher income (7.1), consume less (7.2) and provide more public goods (7.3) than 
without status seeking. Most importantly for the welfare of the poor, under liturgies, when the 
paying rich compete against each other for status, the resulting size of public provision 
available is larger than in the absence of status seeking.14 This finding confirms 
Congleton’s result obtained in a different setting that contests for status bring positive 
external effects for those not taking part in the contest. It also follows that when the 
opportunities to gain prestige and reputation by private outlays for public services decline (as 
the sources allude for the fourth century), the size of liturgies declines too. Finally, in 
accordance to intuition, (7.3) shows that the size of provision increases as the economy 
becomes richer (𝑊1 and / or 𝑊2  rise), but falls as the public good becomes more expensive to 
produce (𝑃 rises). 
6.3 Comparison between liturgies and tax financed public expenditures 
If public expenditures are covered by an income tax on the rich at a proportional rate of 𝑡 and 
the unit cost of public provision remains equal to that paid by liturgists, upon denoting the 
resulting size of public provision by 𝐺𝑇  , the government budget constraint is 
 𝑃𝐺𝑇 = 𝑡(𝑌1 + 𝑌2)        (8) 
In this setting, the budget constraint of 𝑖 = 1,2 is written as  𝑌𝑖 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑊𝑖 (1 − 𝐿𝑖) =  𝐶𝑖. 
The rich then choose  𝐿𝑖 to maximise 𝑈𝑖 =  𝑎𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝑡)𝑊𝑖 (1 − 𝐿𝑖)  + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑇 + (1 − 𝛼 −
                                                             
14 At the extreme, had each individual been unconcerned about how much the other 
contributed, that is, 𝛾 = 0 the size of public provision would have been 𝐺𝑆
0 =
𝛽(𝑊1+𝑊2)
(1+(1−𝛽))𝑃
<   𝐺𝑆 . 
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𝛽)𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖. The latter yields the equilibrium solutions 𝐿𝑖 =
1−𝛼−𝛽
1−𝛽
, 𝑌𝑖 =
𝛼
1−𝛽
𝑊𝑖 and 𝐶𝑖 =
𝛼(1−𝑡)
1−𝛽
𝑊𝑖  . The indirect utility of 𝑖 is then written as 
  𝑈𝑖 =  𝑎𝑙𝑛
𝛼(1−𝑡)
1−𝛽
𝑊𝑖  + 𝛽𝑙𝑛
𝛼𝑡(𝑊1+𝑊2)
1−𝛽
+ (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝑙𝑛
1−𝛼−𝛽
1−𝛽
  (9) 
Assuming as per standard practice that the tax rate is chosen by maximising the sum of the 
utilities of the two taxpayers  𝑈1 +  𝑈2 and solving, we derive the optimal tax rate as 
 𝑡𝑇 =
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
          (10.1)  
The corresponding individual equilibrium levels of consumption and income of the rich are 
𝑌𝑖𝑇 =
𝛼
1−𝛽
𝑊𝑖           (10.2) 
𝐶𝑖𝑇 =
𝛼2𝑊𝑖
(𝛼+𝛽)(1−𝛽)
         (10.3) 
At this level of generality we cannot identify unambiguously whether individual consumption 
and income are greater or smaller under the liturgy system or income taxation. We can 
however compare their sums under the two different systems. The sums of consumption and 
income of the rich, and of public provision are 
   𝑌𝑇 =  𝑌1 +  𝑌2 =
𝛼
1−𝛽
(𝑊1 + 𝑊2)      (11.1) 
   𝐶𝑇 =  𝐶1 + 𝐶2 = 
𝛼2
(𝛼+𝛽)(1−𝛽)
(𝑊1 + 𝑊2)     (11.2) 
 𝐺𝑇 =  
𝛼𝛽
(𝛼+𝛽)(1−𝛽)
(
𝑊1+𝑊2
𝑃
)       (11.3) 
Note that in the present setting of no taxes for the poor and a Cobb-Douglas utility function, 
the equilibrium levels of consumption and leisure of the poor remain the same regardless of 
the fiscal regimes of liturgies or explicit taxation of the rich; only the level of public services 
differs. Whether or not the poor are better off with liturgies or explicit taxes on the incomes 
of the rich, depends on the difference between 𝐺𝑆 and 𝐺𝑇  . From (6.3) and (11.3) we have  
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 ∆𝐺 ≡  𝐺𝑆 − 𝐺𝑇 =  
𝛽((1−𝛽)(𝛽+𝛼𝛾)−𝛼)
(1+(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾))(𝛼+𝛽)(1−𝛽)
 (
𝑊1+𝑊2
𝑃
)   (12.1) 
The latter implies 
 𝐺𝑆 > (<) 𝐺𝑇   when 𝛾 > (<) 
1
1−𝛽
−
𝛽
𝛼
 ≡ 𝛾∗    (12.2) 
That is, at the present level of generality it is ambiguous which of the two systems of finance 
brings the largest level of public goods. The threshold value of the status competition 
parameter 𝛾∗ is positive for values such that 𝛼 > 𝛽(1 − 𝛽), a condition which is assumed to 
hold. From (12.1) we also have that the difference is increasing in 𝛾 since 
𝑑∆𝐺
𝑑𝛾
=
𝑑𝐺𝑆
𝑑𝛾
> 0; that 
is, the greater the quest for status the larger the difference between liturgy and income tax 
provision. Figure 1 graphs the relationship between ∆𝐺 and 𝛾 , and indicates the extreme 
values of ∆𝐺, (those for 𝛾 = 0 , and 𝛾 = 1). From inequality (12.2) we have that for values of 
the status externality parameter greater than the 𝛾∗ threshold the system of liturgy finance 
secures a higher size of public goods than an income tax paid by the rich. We may call a 
setting with high 𝛾, meaning 𝛾 > 𝛾∗ , an “agonistic” one, that is, one of intense status 
competition between the rich. Accordingly, in such an environment the poor majority is 
better off under liturgies rather than income taxation of the rich (and vice versa). The 
qualitative properties of 𝛾∗ are discussed in the Appendix. 
•
g*
0 
Figure 1: The dependence of the difference between the 
size of liturgies and taxation (DG) on status (g) 
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For completion we also examine the effects of paying for liturgies and paying income taxes 
on the size of income, tax burden and consumption of the rich individuals.  Comparing first 
the sum of incomes of the rich under the two different fiscal regimes and upon taking the 
difference between (6.1) and (10.1), we have 
 𝑌𝑆 −  𝑌𝑇 =  
𝛽(1−𝛼−𝛽)
(1−𝛽)(1+(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾))
(𝑊1 + 𝑊2) > 0     (12.3) 
That is, the sum of the incomes of the rich is higher when in the pursuit for status they are 
taxed implicitly through liturgies. 
Further, comparing the implicit and explicit tax rates in (5.5) and (10.1) we have 
𝑡𝑖 > (<) 𝑡𝑇   when 𝑊𝑖 > (<) 
𝑊𝑗
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
       (12.4) 
Inequality (12.4) demonstrates the different tax burdens that the liturgies impose on the 
different members of the group of the rich. However, nothing in the inequality precludes 
that 𝑡𝑖 >  𝑡𝑇  for both 𝑖 = 1,2 , that is, all members of the rich group pay higher implicit taxes 
through liturgies. In turn, this may explain why during the fourth century liturgies were 
resisted by rich Athenians with different levels of wealth.   
Finally, comparing the sum of consumption under payment of liturgies and payment of 
income taxes, (6.2) and (11.2) respectively, we have 
 𝐶𝑆 −  𝐶𝑇 =
𝛼𝛽(𝑊1+𝑊2)(1−𝛽)
2
(𝛼+𝛽)(1−(1−𝛽)2(1−𝛾)2)
(𝛾 +
𝛽
1−𝛽
) (1 +
1−𝛼−𝛽
1−𝛽
− 𝛾) > 0   (12.5) 
The sign of (12.5) is unequivocally positive because 
−𝛽
1−𝛽
< 0 < 𝛾 < 1 < 1 +
1−𝛼−𝛽
1−𝛽
 . Thus, 
under the liturgy system and with the liturgists competing for status, the sum of the 
consumption expenditures of the rich is higher than under income taxation. This result echoes 
that of the standard model of status seeking where the individual compares its private 
consumption spending pattern to the rest of the society and public goods are absent (see e.g., 
Frank, 1985; Layard, 2005).  
7 Conclusions 
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Status considerations mean that the individual is concerned with his relative position in the 
social ladder. The present study investigated aspects of the quest for status in ancient Greece. 
Specifically, it examined a setting where rich individuals sought to establish superior social 
status by performing liturgies, obligatory payments for public services which were jointly 
consumed by the rich and the poor, but expenditure was chosen by the spender. Like several 
unique institutions prevalent in ancient Greece, the liturgy mode of financing public services 
differed significantly from a system of income taxes. Recognising that public goods benefit 
all consumers, the novelty of the study has been to model the quest for status as a negative 
externality, in the sense that a liturgist derives higher benefit from his expense for public 
services relative to the expense of his peers. It was found that this type of status seeking 
increases aggregate provision of public goods. This implies that the ancient Greeks exploited 
human traits for the benefit of the community. The study then proceeded to compare the 
implicit tax implied by paying for liturgies with a hypothetical explicit tax on the income of 
the liturgist, other things being equal. It was concluded that although the size of public 
provision was increasing in the intensity of status seeking externality, it was not clear 
whether public provision under liturgies is greater or lower than under explicit income 
taxation. The more general point of the investigation is that it illustrates the value of using 
economic modelling to develop a more accurate picture of the ancient Greek economy. 
Contrary to the substantivist view of the ancient Greek economy, economic modelling offers 
insights into the behaviour of ancient agents which otherwise would have gone amiss. More 
broadly, financing of liturgies in ancient Greece offers an excellent illustration of how status 
seeking interacts with both politics and economics. 
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Appendix: The determinant of the threshold 𝛾∗ =  
1
1−𝛽
−
𝛽
𝛼
 
Inequality (12.2) of the text implies that, given the value of 𝛾, the lower the level of the 
threshold 𝛾∗ the more likely that the liturgy system yields a higher level of public goods, and 
vice versa.  
Note first that with 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 > 0 it is always 𝛾∗ < 1 .  
Next, since 
𝑑𝛾∗
𝑑𝛼
=
𝛽
𝑎2
> 0 , the smaller the value of 𝛼 , the smaller the corresponding 
threshold 𝛾∗ ; hence, other things being equal, the more likely that 𝐺𝑆 >  𝐺𝑇. Intuitively, a 
society whose rich compete for status through payment for liturgies and which values private 
consumption only modestly (low 𝛼 ) is more likely to choose liturgies. This may be true of 
the Athenian society during the fifth century rather than the fourth (since the sources indicate 
that the rich complained against liturgy payments during the latter). 
However, the relationship between  𝛾∗ and  𝛽 is not monotonic. Specifically,  
𝑑𝛾∗
𝑑𝛽
=
𝛼−(1−𝛽)2
𝛼(1−𝛽)2
> (=, <) 0 for 𝛽 > (=, <)1 − √𝛼  and 
𝑑2𝛾∗
𝑑𝛽2
=
2
(1−𝛽)3
> 0. As 𝛽 increases 
𝛾∗ first declines, but after reaching a minimum equal to 𝛾∗ =
2
√𝛼
−  
1
𝛼
 it rises. Figure A1 
graphs 𝛾∗ against 𝛽 for different values of 𝛼 
0 
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